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In the United States, the law governing monopolies is provided by Section 2 of the Sherman Act and the many judicial opinions interpreting it. 1 In the European Community, monopolization law is provided by Article 82 of the European Community Treaty and related case law.
2 Sherman Act Section 2 says that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any person or persons, to monopolize any part of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony." 3 Article 82 says that "[a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between member States." 4 It then provides several examples of types of abuse. 5 These provisions have generality in common. They are both invitations to their respective courts to develop a common law of competition governing dominant firms. In this respect, the American experience is illuminating because it began much earlier than the European effort. The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, giving us roughly 100 years of case law interpreting it. The case law interpreting Article 82 goes back to the early 1970s. 6 What is also true of the American experience is that it began without a substantial body of common law to help guide courts in interpreting Sherman Act Section 2. This was not true of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Section 1, governing conspiracies, used language that was similar to that developed in the English common law restraint of trade cases, and covered cases involving similar facts. Although American courts decided not to rely on that body of case law, a decision some scholars have suggested was a mistake, 7 courts at least had the option of looking to or relying on that law if they desired to.
With respect to Section 2 of the Sherman Act, there really was no substantial body of law that courts could have looked to for guidance in applying the statute. This presented a 1 For an overview and discussion of statute and case law on monopolization, see PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 368-342 (6th ed. 2004). (a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 6 FAULL & NIKPAY, supra note 2, at 117-203. 7 Mark F. Grady, Toward a Positive Economic Theory of Antitrust, 30 Economic Inquiry 225 (1992).
problem for judges, and is the fundamental reason that Section 2 law has been, as a general rule, relatively unstable and unpredictable in comparison to Section 1. These remarks will focus on the differences between Article 82 and Section 2, reflecting largely on the American experience.
8 I will start with a discussion of the American experience and use that as a background from which to examine the European law on monopolies. In general, American law is more conservative -or, putting it in different terms, European law is more interventionist. Error-cost analysis, increasingly common in American courts, justifies the American approach. I close with a preliminary empirical examination of the determinants of the scope of a country's monopolization law. I find that the scope of a country's monopolization law is inversely related to its degree of trade dependence.
Section 2 Law
Almost every statute is an invitation to courts to develop a common law based on it. That is because the text of a statute is almost never sufficient to resolve all disputes concerning its meaning. Disputes over interpretation inevitably arise and those disputes wind up in court. Judges are called on to fill in the interpretive gaps of the statute.
However, even if we start with an acceptance of the commonplace observation that statutes are invitations to develop common law, Section 2 of the Sherman Act seems to be a surprisingly broad invitation. The American federal legislature invited courts in 1890 to develop a common law of monopolization. What existed before then as common law on monopolization was scant and unlikely to be of much use to courts in interpreting the Sherman Act.
Some scholars have questioned the existence of a pre-Sherman Act common law of monopolization.
9 Perhaps the best evidence of such a body of common law is a single English case, Darcy v. Allen. 10 The queen had granted Darcy a patent to manufacture and import playing cards. The court rejected the patent on the ground that it was against the common law. The court held that the queen had been deceived because patents were designed to enhance social welfare, but this one served no purpose other than to allow Darcy to extract wealth from consumers.
If Darcy v. Allen is an example of the pre-Sherman Act common law of monopoly, then it immediately suggests the enormous difficulties American judges would face in developing common law based on Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The obvious difference is that Darcy v. Allen invalidates efforts by the government to cordon off certain markets and hand them over to monopolists, while Section 2 of the Sherman Act aims at private efforts to monopolize markets. This was arguably a new goal or emphasis for regulators.
There were legislative and common law efforts here and there (e.g., the marketinterference statutes governing "forestalling" and other acts 11 ) to control specific instances of advantage taking based on temporary monopoly status, but no general prohibition of private monopolization on the scale of Section 2.
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The American judges took a conservative approach initially to Section 2. With virtually no case law other than that based on Section 1 to draw on for guidance, they stayed close to the familiar shore, extending the reach of Section 2 only to conduct that seemed most clearly to violate it. 13 The most comprehensive early effort to interpret Section 2 appears in the Standard Oil decision of 1911.
14 Areeda described Standard Oil as "remarkable for its cloudy prolixity," 15 and that is a fair and perhaps charitable summary. It is a singular example of poor writing from the bench; repetitive, vague, and in some parts an impenetrable jungle of big words.
In spite of these weaknesses, Standard Oil does manage to deliver a few basic lessons about the early understanding of Section 2. It adopts the "abuse standard" of monopolization. 16 Under that standard, a firm can be found guilty of violating Section 2 if it engages in conduct that would violate Section 1 if engaged in by a combination of firms. Moreover, the abuse standard requires a finding of specific intent to monopolize.
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Specific intent to monopolize, in turn, is inferred by conduct that cannot be justified on the basis of legitimate competitive goals, conduct that can be understood only as an effort to destroy competition from rivals. The early opinions, including Standard Oil, suggest that is it an objective inquiry based on facts. 18 In other words, the intent inquiry is not described in the early opinions as an effort to discover intent by searching the words of the defendant. It is described as an inference based on the defendant's conduct.
The early cases also made clear that monopoly status by itself is not unlawful. 19 The statute was interpreted to prohibit efforts to monopolize, say by destroying competitors. However, the statute was not interpreted to prohibit the setting of the monopoly price or the monopoly quantity. This part of the early understanding of Section 2 remains valid in American law today.
This conservative approach to Section 2 was not without controversy. Proponents of strong antitrust enforcement wanted a more aggressive interpretation and found their position vindicated, in their eyes, by the government's loss in the United States Steel case of 1920. 20 On the other hand, the conservative approach discouraged judges from attempting to conduct their own consumer-welfare tests of dominant firm conduct. The specific intent approach originally taken with respect to Section 2 asked courts to determine whether there were plausible pro-efficiency or competitive bases for the defendant's conduct. If so, the specific intent test implied that the defendant should not be found guilty of violating Section 2.
The conservative approach came to an end in 1945 with Judge Learned Hand's decision in Alcoa. 21 The Alcoa opinion is a marvel in clarity in comparison to Standard Oil. However, its statement of the new monopolization standard leaves room for alternative interpretations.
22 One point appears to be absolutely clear: the specific intent test is no longer required under Section 2. 23 Beyond that unambiguous point, Judge Hand's decision suggests that, as a general rule, violations of Section 2 will be determined by a balancing of the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the defendant's conduct. In other words, under Hand's test, the defendant may have substantial efficiency justifications for its conduct, yet it may still be found in violation of Section 2 because the anticompetitive effects were deemed too severe by the court.
If one were forced to give a brief summary of American monopoly law, one would have to say that Judge Hand's statement of it remains valid today. Courts continue to refer to it as a starting point in discussions of the monopolization test.
24 But a more detailed look reveals that the standard for monopolization has been altered in practice substantially since Alcoa, and largely in a direction that favors dominant firm defendants. The date at which the change in Section 2 law began appears to be 1975, with the publication of the Areeda and Turner article on predatory pricing. 25 Areeda and Turner noted the uncertainty surrounding predation charges and the costs of error, and proposed a costbased test to screen out predation claims with high error costs. Following their article, courts began to adopt their cost-based screen and to take seriously the costs of false convictions. The changes in Section 2 case law have not occurred across the board, but in specific pockets. One pocket in which the law has changed is predatory pricing. The Matsushita 26 and Brooke Group 27 line of cases require, in order to hold a firm guilty of predatory pricing under Section 2, a price below some measure of cost (average variable cost usually) and objective evidence that the defendant would be able to recoup the losses incurred in the predatory (low-price) period. 28 The Brooke Group test is equivalent to a specific intent test. 29 The reason is that if the requirements of the Brooke Group test are satisfied, then one can say that the objective evidence implies that the defendant's intent could only have been predatory.
As this example suggests, the type of monopolization test, or how it is framed, is not all that important in the end -though I recognize that much ink has been spilled over this issue. Whether the monopolization test is framed, as in the pre-1945 period, in terms of specific intent, or, as in the post-1945 period, as a consumer welfare balancing test, the underlying question is the evidentiary burden placed on plaintiffs in a monopolization case. In general, the specific intent test, as historically applied, puts the greatest evidentiary burden on the plaintiff. The consumer welfare test, by its terms, places a much lighter burden on the plaintiff. But if the consumer welfare test were coupled with several additional evidentiary burdens -e.g., standards requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence -it could present roughly the same obstacles to plaintiffs as the specific intent test. Conversely, if the specific intent test were applied in a way that put too little weight on defendant's evidence and too much weight on plaintiff's anticompetitive theories, the results might be indistinguishable from a consumer welfare balancing test applied with a pro-plaintiff bias. The issue at bottom is one of evidentiary burden.
Another pocket of Section 2 case law in which courts seem to have drifted back to the specific intent formulation is that involving "essential facilities". 30 The holding in Aspen, 31 which suggested that the defendant lost solely because it failed to provide a credible competitive justification for its conduct, carried the implication that the mere provision of such a justification would immunize a defendant from liability in an essential facilities case. That implication was apparently confirmed with Justice Scalia's opinion in Trinko. Then, when it gets around to actually applying the test to Microsoft's conduct, it moves into a specific intent analysis. The court repeatedly condemns Microsoft's conduct because it appeared, to the court, to have no credible pro-efficiency or competitive rationale. 35 As an illustration of the inability of verbal formulations to tightly constrain the decision making of courts, the D.C. Circuit's application of the specific intent test put so little weight on Microsoft's justifications that it was arguably equivalent to a balancing test conducted with a pro-plaintiff bias. For example, in examining the complaints concerning Microsoft's integration of Internet Explorer with its Windows operating system, the court found that two of the three complaints (excluding Internet Explorer from the Add/Remove Programs function and commingling browser and operating system code) were violations of the Sherman Act, because Microsoft offered no credible procompetitive justification, while one (overriding the choice of an alternative default browser in certain circumstances) was not a violation because Microsoft's justification was sufficient. 36 Yet it seems that the technical justifications offered by Microsoft, and accepted by the court, in response to the complaint that was rejected should apply just as well to the other two complaints.
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Recent decisions and commentary have recommended that a profit-sacrifice test be used in place of the consumer welfare test. 38 The sacrifice test asks whether the dominant firm conduct in question would be profitable but for its tendency to eliminate or lessen competition. 39 The profit-sacrifice test has the appeal, to some observers, of being able to operate in a manner similar to the specific intent test. Indeed, the aim of the profitsacrifice is the same as the more general specific intent test: to limit findings of guilt under Section 2 to those instances in which the evidence suggests that the dominant in Aspen as refusing, without a competitive justification, to supply a product at retail price to one's competitor, Id., at 408-409, which suggested an intent to harm. The defendant in Trinko failed to provide a pro-competitive justification for its actions. However, the Court refused to find an antitrust violation based solely on the defendant's failure to accept a statutory burden to support rivals. Thus, Trinko implicitly holds that a sufficient justification for denying access to an essential facility is the desire to avoid providing a benefit to a rival. If that is a sufficient justification for denying liability, then it follows that a plaintiff, in order to prevail in an essential facilities case, has to present evidence indicating that the defendant had an intent to harm its rival. 33 37 If Internet Explorer should be allowed to override an alternative browser in order to allow the user to get to Microsoft's "HELP" site, then it would seem to follow that the company would want to prevent the user from removing Internet Explorer from the list of programs integrated into the operating system. 38 The profit-sacrifice test is suggested by the language of Aspen, 472 U.S. firm's conduct could only have been motivated by an intent to monopolize and not to benefit consumers.
It is not clear that the sacrifice test provides an advantage over the more general specific intent language of early Section 2 cases. It may seem to provide better guidance to courts and in this sense to discipline what might otherwise be an unruly and far-reaching inquiry. However, the downside is that it may narrow the focus too much. The sacrifice test generates questions about the benchmark against which the profit sacrifice is measured, whether the test refers to long-run or short-run profit, and other questions as well. 40 In addition, the sacrifice test fails to operate in a manner similar to a welldesigned specific intent test when courts give too much credit to speculative theories of competitive harm and too little credit to pro-competitive defenses. 41 Summing up, American courts have shown an inclination to be conservative in interpreting Section 2 of the Sherman Act. I mean conservative in the sense of showing reluctance to penalize a firm simply because of its monopoly status, and of allowing wide scope, at least at the level of pure legal doctrine, for efficiency defenses to be asserted. Of the roughly 115 years that the Sherman Act has been in effect, courts applied a specific intent test under Section 2 for 55 of those years -from 1890 to 1945, the date of Alcoa. Alcoa introduced a balancing test in 1945 and scrapped the specific intent test. However, since roughly 1975 and beginning with the predatory pricing cases, we have seen the reemergence of various versions of the specific intent approach.
Judging Article 82 in light of the American experience
Viewed in light of the American experience, Article 82 reflects a less conservative, more interventionist approach toward antitrust law. Perhaps the most obvious illustration of this is the fact that Article 82 has been interpreted to make unlawful, as a form of monopoly abuse, the charging of a monopoly price. The first general application provided in the text of Article 82, referring to a type of abuse that violates the treaty provision is "directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;…" 42 
America versus Europe: Some Examples
American antitrust courts decided early on not to regulate pricing under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In the first case interpreting the Sherman Act to reach the Supreme Court, 40 Id; Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stanford L. Rev. 253 (2003) . 41 Indeed, one example in which the sacrifice test is particularly ill-fitting is that of predatory pricing. Suppose the dominant firm cuts its price, but the price remains above incremental and average cost after the price cut. Suppose, in addition, the firm suffers a loss in profits as a result of the price cut. The profitsacrifice test might imply that the defendant has engaged in monopolization, if the defendant's justifications appear to be inadequate to the court. 
U.S. v. Trans-Missouri,
43 the Court majority argued against adopting a reasonableness test on the ground that the court would be required by such a test to determine the reasonableness of prices.
If only that kind of contract which is an unreasonable restraint of trade be within the meaning of the statute, and declared therein to be illegal, it is at once apparent that the subject of what is a reasonable rate is attended with great uncertainty. What is a proper standard by which to judge the fact of reasonable rates? Must the rate be so high as to enable the return for the whole business done to amount to a sum sufficient to afford the shareholder a fair and reasonable profit upon his investment? If so, what is a reasonable profit? 44 As an argument against using some notion of reasonableness in interpreting the Sherman Act, the Trans-Missouri Court's opinion is unpersuasive. Pre-Sherman Act common law decisions on contracts in restraint of trade employed the reasonableness test without being led into an examination of the reasonableness of prices or profits. 45 The reasonableness test applies to the defendant firm's allegedly anticompetitive conduct, not to the prices or profits that result from that conduct.
However, as an argument against using law to establish appropriate guidelines for price or profit levels, the Trans-Missouri opinion makes points that are no less valid today than they were 100 years ago. American courts have consistently rejected the notion that the Sherman Act calls on judges to take on the functions of regulatory commissions with power over pricing decisions. 46 This seems to be a sensible view, because if the United States Congress had intended the Sherman Act to require such expansive interventionism, it should have appointed an agency of experts to carry out the regulatory scheme. Judges are not trained to examine the relations among prices, profits, and costs in order to determine the most reasonable or the fairest balance.
Predation is another good illustration of the sizeable differences between European and American courts in applying monopolization law. As I noted earlier, the Matsushita and Brooke Group cases in America require from the plaintiff, in order to survive a summary judgment motion, proof that the dominant firm priced below average variable cost and that the firm was likely to recoup its losses from pricing below cost. In contrast, the European Court of Justice, in cases such as AKZO and Tetra Pak II, has held that pricing below average variable cost violates the law against predation, and prices below average cost also violate the law although the defendant can rebut the presumption of a violation. 47 Moreover, there is no requirement on the part of the plaintiff to prove a high likelihood of recoupment. 48 The "essential facilities" doctrine is a third illustration of the formal differences between European and American monopolization law. Trinko implies that the set of cases in which the essential facilities doctrine will be used by a court to force a dominant firm to share access to some input with a competitor is quite narrow. The Court's discussion in Trinko suggests that evidence of an intent to monopolize is required. In contrast, the European Court of Justice has been considerably more receptive to the essential facilities doctrine and has not attempted to limit its application to a narrow set of circumstances. 49 
Predation and Error Costs
It is commonplace by now to note that the differences between European and American law on predatory pricing reflect different views on the costs of error. The American approach puts a great deal of weight on the costs of false convictions. Erroneously holding firms liable for setting prices too low penalizes dominant firms for competing vigorously. This discourages competition, a result opposite to that intended by the Sherman Act. The European approach puts more emphasis on the costs of false acquittals. If false acquittal costs are constrained over time by competition, as Easterbrook argued, 50 the American approach would result in superior law.
One could stop at the observation that the wisdom of the American approach depends on the balance of error costs. This would be a convenient and diplomatic statement because no one has carried out an empirical study of the balance of error costs in predatory pricing cases. Hence, noting that the relative wisdom of the two approaches depends on the balance of error costs leaves us with an invitation to do empirical research and perhaps not much more. Moreover, the prospect of answering the welfare question on the basis of empirical research seems slim, because it is hard to isolate the effects of different predation laws on consumer welfare.
An alternative and less diplomatic perspective is the decision-theoretic approach set out in the Hylton and Salinger article, and in the Evans and Padilla article. 51 Let the fraction of competitive price cuts be given by P(C). Let the fraction of anticompetitive (i.e., predatory) price cuts be given by P(A). Let the likelihood that a competitive price cut is ruled anticompetitive be given by P(A′|C), and P(A′|A) the rate of correct decisions given anticompetitive conduct. Bayes' rule tells us that the fraction of competitive instances within the sample of decisions in which the competition authority has deemed the price cutter's conduct anticompetitive is:
Let us suppose that the vast majority of price cuts are procompetitive, say 95 percent. Suppose that the competition authority makes mistakes in only 5 percent of all cases. It follows that the likelihood that a case that has been deemed anticompetitive by the competition authority is really competitive is ½. In other words, half of the cases in which the court finds the conduct anticompetitive were instances in which the conduct really was competitive.
The decision-theoretic approach focuses on the background rate of competitive instances within a certain class of conduct and on the rate at which competition authorities are likely to err in evaluating the conduct. If we take price cuts as a class of conduct, we are likely to find that the vast majority of them are procompetitive. Moreover, a competition authority is likely to have difficulty, ex post, in distinguishing competitive and anticompetitive price cuts. Suppose, for example, that instead of the 5 percent error rate assumed in the previous example, competition authorities make mistakes in 20 percent of predatory pricing cases. Using the Bayes' rule approach just described, the rate of false positives jumps from 50 percent to 83 percent. Moreover, holding error rates fixed and letting the proportion of competitive price cuts rise toward 100 percent causes the rate of false convictions to approach 100 percent.
One might argue that this discussion merely shows that when the law is working, in the sense of inducing actors to comply with it, there will be a high rate of false convictions.
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However, the message here is different. It is quite plausible in the pricing context to presume that the vast majority of price cuts would be procompetitive even in the absence of antitrust law. Competition already provides a substantial if not sufficient spur for firms to engage in price cutting. Given this, it is not the law that gives us the 95 percent background rate of competitive price cuts, it is competition. If competition gives us a high rate of competitive price cuts, then we need to worry about the effects of a high rate of false convictions on the incentives already put into place by competition.
In other words, the competitive price cut example in antitrust should be distinguished from that of compliance with tort law rules. In the tort law setting, there are not, as a general rule, substantial private-interest motivations that would lead one to take costly precautions in order to avoid harming others. A person who drives does not, in the typical case, have strong private-interest motivations to take care to avoid harming strangers. When we see a high rate of compliance with the law in the torts context, that is quite likely due to the threat of liability. A high rate of false convictions may simply be a reflection that the law is working as intended. In the antitrust setting, in contrast, competition already provides a substantial private-interest motivation for firms to make price cuts. A high rate of false convictions, then, is not necessarily a sign that the law is compelling firms to comply with its provisions. Given this, there is a much greater likelihood in the antitrust than in the torts setting that the law distorts unilateral conduct away from the socially preferable.
This argument is clearly capable of being generalized from the predatory pricing example. In general, when the law imposes penalties on conduct that is typically procompetitive, there is a high risk of false convictions that both discourage procompetitive conduct and encourage wasteful litigation. Legal and evidentiary standards should be adjusted to take these costs into account. The evolution of American monopolization law toward the Brooke Group standard reflects precisely this sort of adjustment.
An Empirical Approach
Aside from the decision theoretic critique briefly recounted here, the only other basis for telling whether the American or European approach to monopolization law is superior is an empirical examination. Since the European approach is more interventionist, the proper question is whether it leads to superior economic results. This would be a difficult project. Economic outcomes are determined by many factors in addition to monopolization law.
An alternative empirical question is to ask what factors seem to explain the variation in monopolization laws within the EC countries and between the United States and the EC. The chart below (Table 1) shows a "dominance score" for the United States and countries that were members of the European Community before 2004. The dominance score reflects the number of different practices explicitly mentioned in the nation's laws governing the conduct of dominant firms. 53 Luxembourg has the sparsest law of them all, with a dominance score of one. It is followed by Belgium with a dominance score of three.
There appears to be a correlation between the dominance score and the share of imports in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 54 The country with the lowest dominance score, Luxembourg, also has the highest share of imports in GDP (97 percent). The country 53 Although I compiled the scores in Table 1 on my own (working with Nicola Leiter), the approach follows that of Michael Nicholson, "Quantifying Antitrust Regimes" (February 5, 2004) . FTC Bureau of Economics Working Papers No. 267. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=531124 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.531124. Under Nicholson's scheme, each country is given a score of 1 if the part of its competition statute covering dominance (monopolization) prohibits one of the following practices: (1) limiting access (restricting supply), (2) abusive acts, (3) price setting, (4) discriminatory pricing, (5) resale price maintenance, (6) blocking entry. Thus, 6 is the maximum "dominance score" possible, and 0 is the minimum. The scores were compiled by reading the competition law statutes for each country and, where necessary, supplementing the information from case law or other legal reports. 54 The imports as percent of GDP data, for the year 1999, are from World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2002.
with the next lowest dominance score, Belgium, also has a relatively high import share (73 percent). Countries with relatively low import shares have relatively high dominance scores. The strength of a country's laws on monopolization seems to increase as the share of trade in GDP declines. Put another way, as a country becomes more dependent on trade, it tends to relax its laws governing dominant firms. What might explain this pattern? Before offering any hypotheses to explain the correlation in Table 1 , I should note that I am aware that the laws of the individual EC member countries are to some extent preempted by the Article 82 of the EC treaty. The relationship between national laws and EC law is as follows. For those matters that do not involve commerce among the several EC member states (i.e., intra-state, small business matters) the laws of the individual states govern. 55 For those matters that involve commerce among the EC member states, Article 82 governs. 56 However, Article 82 provides a floor and not a ceiling on monopolization laws. Individual member states are permitted to go beyond Article 82 in prohibiting conduct not prohibited by Article 82 (e.g., price cuts when price is above average cost) and in specifying penalties. 57 But even in this instance, the individual nation laws may be of interest as a signal of the individual nation's own priorities with respect to enforcement. For these reasons I think it is worthwhile to examine the variation in the dominance laws of various nations.
The roughly inverse correlation between the strength of dominance law, as reflected in national statutes, and the share of trade in GDP may reflect pressures, or the lack of pressures, from the supply side or from the demand side of the legislative process. Consider the demand side. The possible demand-side victims of monopolization are domestic consumers and domestic producers operating downstream from a monopolist. In a heavily trade-dependent economy, the potential victims of monopolization may not find a great need for a statute governing the conduct of dominant domestic firms because those firms are already disciplined by the traded goods sector. If they were to attempt to raise their prices to monopoly levels, they would invite importing firms to invade their customer bases. Given this type of limit-pricing equilibrium, domestic pressure groups consisting of the potential demand-side victims of monopolization would see little need in pressuring the legislature to enact a statute governing the conduct of dominant firms.
Supply side pressure, or the lack of it, provides an alternative explanation for the rough inverse correlation between trade and the strength of dominant firm law. The possible supply-side victims of firms that monopolize are direct competitors who are frozen out of markets as a result of the conduct of dominant firms. Presumably, these potential victims always have an interest is some level of protection from competition. One exception to this might be observed when the domestic firms are roughly equal in ability to inflict competitive harm on one another and view such harms as "live and let live" nuisances. However, this is unlikely to be observed. Another exception is when the pressure group formed of these firms is unable to overcome opposition or indifference from other legislative coalitions. This is a plausible scenario in a relatively trade-dependent state.
Determining whether the demand-side or supply-side explanation of monopoly legislation is correct is a separate empirical project. However, legislation is understood today as often the product of concentrated rather than diffuse interest groups. The demand-side theory -that the inverse correlation between the strength of monopoly law and trade dependency is due to a lack of demand from consumers -posits the existence of pressure from diffuse interest groups. The supply theory, on the other hand, explains observed legislation as a function of the strength or weakness of concentrated interest groups. The supply-side theory has the advantage of being consistent with modern explanations of legislation.
